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The common consent argument (hereafter CCA) is an epistemic argument, rather than a metaphysical one.​[5]​  The argument is not that human opinions make it the case that God exists (i.e. that God’s existence depends in any way on human attitudes toward God), but rather that human opinions provide good evidence to believe that God exists.  In fact, the argument claims that the evidence provided by the pervasiveness of theistic belief is good enough to make it reasonable to believe that God exists.​[6]​

CCA is best seen as a kind of inference to the best explanation, claiming that the prevalence of theistic belief is best explained by the existence of God.  So, if we take the prevalence of theistic belief as our datum, the idea is that God’s existence best explains the datum. We can formalize such an understanding of CCA as follows:

1.	The belief that God exists is very prevalent.
2.	God existing is a good explanation of the prevalence of the belief that God exists.
3.	God existing better explains the prevalence of the belief that God exists than any available rival explanation.
4.	Therefore, God exists.​[7]​

Before turning to the particular premises of the CCA, we can pause to consider its form.  CCA is not a valid argument – it’s premises do not entail its conclusion.  It is possible for (1)-(3) to all be true, and yet nevertheless God does not exist.  While not valid, proponents of the argument claim that its premises give good abductive support for its conclusion – enough to make it rational to believe the conclusion.  We can see that arguments of this form can be good arguments by considering the following: 

1’. The belief that the recycling is getting picked up today is prevalent in my neighborhood.​[8]​
2’. The recycling getting picked up today is a good explanation of the prevalence of the belief that it is.
3’. The recycling being picked up today better explains the prevalence of the belief that it is than any available rival explanation.
4’. The recycling is getting picked up today.

Suppose that when sending the kids off to school I notice that most my neighbors have put out their full recycling containers.  Knowing that the pesky HOA gets upset when people leave their recycling out for more than a day, and that my neighbors don’t like getting in trouble with the HOA but do want their recycling picked up, I become justified in believing that most my neighbors believe the recycling truck is coming today.  So, I am justified in believing (1’).  Here, the datum is the prevalence (in my neighborhood) of the relevant recycling belief.  What best explains this datum? Why might my neighbors believe this?  Several explanations may come to mind:
	
A.	The recycling is getting picked up today.
B.	Most of my neighbors are mistaken about what day it is.
C.	A mischievous individual, who sent most my neighbors fake recycling date change notifications, has deceived them.
D.	Most my neighbors have excessive recycling and really want it to be picked up today, and this desire has caused them to believe that it will be picked up today.

While each of these explanations can account for the prevalence (in my neighborhood) of the belief that the recycling is coming today, they do not each explain this datum equally well.  In fact, all besides (A) can be rejected quite quickly.  Explanation (A) is a pretty good explanation of the datum.  Given what I know about my neighbors, I would expect most of them to believe it was recycling day whenever it in fact was recycling day.  Sure, one of them might occasionally get the recycling date wrong, but the odds that they’re all wrong seems very low. This shows that I am justified in believing premises (2’) as well.  Given the how well the truth of my neighbor’s belief explains its prevalence, there is a high bar for competitor explanation. Rival explanations BA—D are all overly complicated or fail to explain the datum very well. So, it is reasonable to believe (3’). Finally, it seems clear that I am also justified in believing (4’) on the basis of (1’) – (3’).  I am justified in believing (4’), and appealing to (1’) – (3’) is the best account of why.  If my wife asks me why I think the recycling is being picked up today, referencing the beliefs of my neighbors looks like a legitimate response. So, the recycling argument looks perfectly good. Since CCA shares this same logical structure, there are no issues with the general form of CCA.

The recycling argument shows us that appealing tobeing aware of the prevalence of a belief in a community can make it reasonable for an individual to think likewise.  Does it do so in CCA?  Whether it does so will depend upon the plausibility of its premises.  Let’s consider each in turn. Premise (1) claims that the belief that God exists is very prevalent.  A 2018 Pew Research Center survey found that 80% of Americans believe that God exists and over 90% believe in a higher power. According 2010 Pew Research Center data, close to 55% of the world’s population belong to one of the big three monotheistic religions: Islam, Christianity, or Judaism.​[9]​  The numbers are much higher for religious membership in general, with 84% of the world’s population claiming some religious affiliation.​[10]​  According to Zuckerman’s analysis of the data to the converse question (how many people do not believe that God exists?), as of 2007, between 500 million and 750 million people in the world do not believe that God exists (a relatively small percentage of the 6.7 billion people at the time).​[11]​  Further, the prevalence of theistic belief increases when we include the opinions of those no longer living.​[12]​

How popular must a belief be for it to be prevalent? There is no plausible and precise amount here.  While not universal, belief that God exists is more prevalent than the belief that the recycling gets picked up today (at least in many instances of the recycling argument).  For instance, the recycling argument does not require me to conclude that 75% or even 60% of my neighbors believe that the recycling is being picked up in my neighborhood today.  The recycling belief is prevalent enough even when the numbers are comparable to the percentage of theistic believers. Given this, the numbers outlined above seem to suffice for making theistic belief prevalent enough for premise (1) to be accepted. In fact, premise (1) looks to be even better supported than (1’), at least on most recycling occasions.

Premise (2) also looks quite reasonable. In general, the truth of a belief is a pretty good explanation for the prevalence of that belief.  Plausibly, what best explains the prevalence of the beliefs that being kind is good, that the Earth is roughly spherical, and that more than 100 people exist, is the truth of these beliefs. Similarly, God’s existence is a very good explanation for the prevalence of the belief that God exists.​[13]​ Of course, prevalently held beliefs can be false.  It is not too difficult to think about beliefs that are both prevalent and false.  Sometimes we have a better explanation for the prevalence of the belief than its truth.  For instance, if I have framed the butler for a murder, I may know that the belief that the butler committed the crime is quite prevalent among the relevant parties, but such knowledge would not make it reasonable for me to believe that the butler did it!​[14]​ In such a case, I have a better explanation of the convergence of their opinions – my deceit.  Other times, the best thing to think is that the prevalent belief was rationally held (and even rational due to its prevalence) at the time even though it turned out to be false.  For example, it was rational for many in the early 1400s to believe that the Earth was flat, and for some, the rationality of this belief may have come solely from what they knew about what other people believed about the matter.  While this belief was false, its falsity does not prevent it from being supported by the evidence (at the time). 

Whether it is rational to believe premise (3) will depend upon the explanatory power of alternative explanations.  Given (2), God’s existence is a good explanation of the prevalence of theistic belief, so whether it is rational to accept (3) will depend upon whether any rival explanation does at least as good of a job explaining the datum.even better. For now, we will delay judgment on (3) as we will examine several rival explanations in the objections. Absent the discovery of a superior rival explanation, it will be rational to believe (3) as well.

So, there is reason to think that CCA is a successful argument. We have seen reason to accept (1) and (2), and we have seen that (1) – (3) provide good rational support for (4). If no superior rival explanation is found, it looks like CCA is a success. Before turning to an examination of rival explanations, and other objections to CCA, we will pause to note why interest in CCA may be on the rise. Further reason to take CCA seriously comes from current research in philosophy and the social sciences. Developments in these fields look to breathe new life into CCA.


A New Twist: Higher-Order Evidence & The Wisdom of Groups

Interest in CCA may be on the rise again given recent interest in nature and value of higher-order evidence and social epistemology more generally. Social epistemology concerns the social dimensions of knowledge and rationality.  Within the growing literature in social epistemology are emerging debates about higher-order evidence. Higher-order evidence is evidence that is about the evidence for some proposition.  For instance, (your) evidence that someone else has evidence for a proposition is itself higher-order evidence (for you) regarding that proposition. That a generally reasonable personsomeone has a belief has been seen as one important kind of higher-order evidence. If I know that Jenna has been looking into the best landscaping companies and believes that Greener Grass is the way to go, then in knowing of her belief I get evidence that she has good evidence that Greener Grass is the company to go with. So, I have (higher-order) evidence that Greener Grass is the company to go with even without accessing the information on which Jenna is basing her belief. Given the kind of cognitive creatures that we are, knowing that someone believes a proposition is evidence that they have evidence in favor of that proposition – it is evidence that their belief is an appropriate response to the evidence that they possess. 

The epistemic impact of the beliefs of others has been at the forefront of the burgeoning literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement.  Here, much of the debate has been about whether discovering that someone else disagrees with you undermines the rationality of your belief by giving you higher-order evidence against what you believe.​[15]​  Most in the debate agree that discovering a disagreement gives you at least some evidence against your belief​[16]​, but theorists still dispute how strong this evidence is as well as how it interacts with the pieces first-order evidence you possess. While thinking about disagreement may have brought greater attention to the higher-order evidence provided by beliefs, such findings carry over to agreement as well.​[17]​  Just as finding out that someone else disagrees with you can give you evidence against your belief, finding out that someone else agrees with you can give you evidence in favor of your belief.  Finding out that many people agree about some issue, can provide strong evidence for what they believe.  In fact, it is commonplace to rely on agreement within a community as our sole evidential basis for what we believe about it.  For instance, because I have not directly studied the topics, the rationality of my beliefs about climate change, the effects of vaccines, and the health benefits of flossing entirely depends upon what I know about what people in a good epistemic position on the matters believe. In fact, Hilary Kornblith claims that, “one would have to be a radical skeptic about mathematics, logic, probability, and decision theory to think that convergence of opinion is not, at this point in the history of those fields, evidence of truth.” (2010: 40-41) 

Further support for the evidential impact of agreement comes from the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  According to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, so long as individuals are more likely than not to be correct on a dichotomous matter, the majority opinion becomes more and more likely to be correct as more individual opinions are added to the mix. For instance, in a group of 250 people who are each individually 0.51 likely to be correct on some matter, the majority opinion is 0.62 likely to be correct.  In a group of 10,000 people with the same epistemic credentials, the majority opinion is 0.98 likely to be correct.​[18]​  The Condorcet Jury Theorem thus shows the strong support that majority opinion can give, particularly as the numbers get large, and as we have seen, the agreeing parties in terms of theistic belief number in the billions!

Social scientists have also been appreciating the wisdom of crowds.​[19]​ Here, research shows that relying on group opinions is a reliable way to go. The phenomenon of relying on a group average opinion is becoming commonplace. When deciding what movie to see, which restaurant to eat at, which plumber to call, or which car to buy, many of us rely on the average satisfaction report from aof number of people who have utilized the service or product. Further, we take assurance when the average is backed by a large number of reviews. Such reliance on groups is backed up by social science as well. For instance, James Surowiecki (2004) provides a number of real-world examples that show the benefits of relying on group wisdom. One example comes from the popular game show of the early 2000’s, Who Wants to be a Millionaire?  In this quiz show, players had three possible ‘lifelines’: eliminating two of the four possible answers (the 50/50), calling a knowledgeable friend, and polling the studio audience.  Analysis of the data has shown that polling the audience was a much better strategy then calling the expert-friend.  In particular, the expert-friend had about a 65% chance of being correct, while the majority studio audience answer was correct 91% of the time.​[20]​  So, while relying on an expert-friend was a good strategy, there was more wisdom in the majority opinion of a somewhat random group of strangers.  Cass Sunstein (2008) notes than when a group of 56 individuals guessed the number of beans in a jar, their average guess (871) was closer to the correct answer (850) than all but one of the individual guesses. This data indicates that going with the prevalent opinion can be a pretty reliable way to navigate the world.

However, the CCA is not without its dissenters.  And that’s putting it mildly. In what follows, we will examine a series of objections to the argument.  The objections will address the overall project, as well as each individual premise in the formalized argument above.


Objection to the Project

One objection to CCA has to do with the very idea of believing that God exists just because other people do.  While the recycling argument shows that this is not always a problem, one might think that the recycling argument and CCA are disanalogous in important ways.  Recent debates about the appropriateness of moral deference have been concerned with the fact that something seems amiss about taking on a moral belief simply on someone else’s say-so, even though in general there is nothing wrong with deferring to others (at least experts).​[21]​  Religious deference might seem problematic in the same ways that moral deference does.​[22]​  Some things, it might be thought, just simply shouldn’t be believed on someone else’s say-so.  The idea here is that this second-hand evidence isn’t always up to the task.  For instance, while many items can happily be bought second-hand, swimsuits are a different matter.  In the same way, second-hand evidence might not be the right kind of thing to base at least some beliefs upon. So, according to this objection, while the recycling argument might be perfectly fine, when the content of the argument shifts to something like belief in God, things break down. Mill maintains something along these lines claiming, “[b]ut to a thinker the argument from other people’s opinions has little weight. It is but second-hand evidence; and merely admonishes us to look out for and weigh the reasons on which this conviction of mankind or of wise men was founded” (1885 [1998], p. 156).  Further, as Kelly (2011) notes, when it comes to investigating many important issues, we tend to look for arguments as opposed to surveys.






Objections to (1) claim that theistic belief is either not prevalent, or not prevalent in the relevant way.  The Condorcet Jury Theorem, and the appeal to the evidence of belief more generally, relied on two key factors: (i) the likelihood of individuals being correct, and (ii) the independence of their opinions.  The evidential power in the numbers relied on both the individual opinions being more likely to be true than not, and the individual opinions being independently formed.  Both factors can be seen to obtain in the recycling analogy.  Most likely, my neighbors came to their recycling beliefs independently without consulting each other, and while they may miss a week here or there, they are more likely than not to be correct about the recycling day.  However, things are not so straightforward regarding CCA. In fact, there can be worries about each of the key factors obtaining regarding the prevalence of theistic belief.  

The first worry concerns our likelihood to be correct about God’s existence.  Are those appealed to in (1) more likely than not to be correct about whether God exists?  If not, then the prevalence of theistic belief would actually count against God’s existence.  If the likelihood of a correct belief is less than 0.5, then adding individuals only makes the group opinion less likely to be correct!  Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess our likelihood to be correct on such matters without begging the question on the issue at hand.  If God exists, then those who believe that are quite reliable in their theistic belief.  If God does not exist, then they are quite unreliable.  However, our likelihood to be right about a question is typically informed by our reliability regarding questions in the neighborhood.  One way to push against the reliability of theistic belief/disbelief without begging the question regarding God’s existence is to examine the diversity of religious beliefs outside of the belief that God exists.  Even if we suppose that God does exist, there is so much disagreement in the details that it might be thought that on the whole we must be unreliable in forming religious beliefs in general.  

Second, there are also issues surrounding belief independence.  In the Condorcet Jury Theorem, it is important for the result that the individual opinions are independently formed – that each individual in the group has come to their conclusion without influence from the other group member’s.  Pinpointing exactly how to understand ‘independence’ here is no easy matter​[23]​, but religious beliefs do not look like good candidates for independently formed beliefs.  Individuals rarely form their theistic beliefs in isolation.  The contingency of religious belief seems to indicate that where, and when, an individual exists plays a significant role in whether they believe God exists, as well as which other religious beliefs they have.​[24]​ This is at least some indication that religious beliefs tend to not be independently formed.  Further, the use of political and social power to promote religious belief has been all too common.​[25]​ If the prevalence of an opinion was achieved without independence, it will have much less evidential value.  If I find out that all my other neighbors just put out their recycling because Susan did (because they all just do what Susan does), then the prevalence of their recycling belief carries much less weight. Similarly, if the prevalence of theistic belief in some community is simply due to the fact that most people in the community are blindly believing whatever Pastor Steve says, their opinions will carry less evidential weight.​[26]​   

While independence is of some epistemic value, we should be careful to not over-emphasize it.​[27]​  Everyone conducting their own intellectual business in their own intellectual silos is hardly an intellectual ideal.  There is great benefit from a shared epistemic division of labor.  Recent epistemology has shifted from a more individualist model to one more appreciative of the social dimensions of knowledge and rationality.  For instance, we want our scientist’s views to be shaped by the work and insights of other scientists as well.  So, while there is some evidential value in independently formed opinions, such opinions can also come with an epistemic cost.  






One reason to reject that God’s existence is a good explanation of the prevalence of theistic belief is to appeal to divine hiddenness.  Here the claim is that if God exists, we would expect that fact to be much more obvious than it is, and so the prevalence of theistic belief would be much higher than it is, if not universal.  The problem of divine hiddenness is typically seen as an argument for atheism.  In brief, it claims that if God existed there wouldn’t be reasonable, non-culpable, non-belief, but since there is such non-belief in God’s existence, God does not exist.​[30]​  If God’s existence is incompatible with reasonable, non-culpable, non-belief (or made implausible by such non-belief), then God’s existence would not be a very good explanation of prevalence of theistic belief.  According to this line of thought, if God existed we should expect much more (if not universal) theistic belief.  So, even if theistic belief is much more prominent than non-belief, God’s existence would not be a good explanation of the prevalence of theistic belief given that there is still far too much non-belief.  

While the problem of divine hiddenness is worthy of more attention than we can give it here, we can briefly outline the debate.​[31]​  Since it is clear that God could be less hidden than God is (and thus that there could be more theistic belief than there is), responses to the problem of divine hiddenness have either tried to identify a justifying reason for God to be hidden (at least to the extent that God is hidden)​[32]​, or to deny that creatures like us are in a position to draw justified conclusions about what reasons God may or may not have.​[33]​  The success of CCA, and support for endorsing (2), will rely in part on how successful these responses to the problem of divine hiddenness are.  If we should expect much more theistic belief given God’s existence, then God’s existence may not be a very good explanation of the theistic belief we do find. 






Objections to (3) put forward rival explanations of the prevalence of theistic belief that purport to better explain the datum (the prevalence of theistic belief).  Put differently, they attempt to show why the prevalence of theistic belief should not be very surprising if God doesn’t exist. Many such naturalistic rival explanations of the prevalence of theistic belief exist. Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche, among others, have each given a kind of debunking argument for theistic belief.  For Freud, theistic belief is a kind of wish-fulfillment. For Marx, theistic belief is the result of a cognitive dysfunction resulting from the problematic social order. For Nietzsche, the origin of theistic belief is in the resentment of the oppressed and the adoption of their ‘slave morality’.​[35]​  

Perhaps the most pressing naturalistic challenge to theistic belief has come from the cognitive science of religion.  The cognitive science of religion has been focused on explaining religious belief, and belief in God’s existence in particular.​[36]​  Utilizing resources in developmental psychology, anthropology, and evolutionary science, cognitive scientists of religion have argued that humans are naturally disposed to believe in God.​[37]​  There are two broad ways to account for religious belief here.  First, it could be that religious belief was selected for.  For instance, Wilson (2002) argues that religious beliefs are adaptive for groups, making the groups more cohesive, co-operative, with members who self-sacrifice for the greater good.  Second, it could be that religious belief is an accidental by-product of other features that were selected for.​[38]​  For instance, humans possess a hyperactive agency detective device (HADD), which strongly inclines them to interpret ambiguous information as having an agential cause.  HADD was selected for because as Barrett (2004) puts it, “if you bet that something is an agent and it isn’t, not much is lost. But if you bet that something is not an agent and it turns out to be one, you could be lunch.” (p. 31) While HADD was selected for other purposes, this cognitive mechanism, which leads us to conclude that agency is involved even when it isn’t, also contributes to the formation of religious beliefs.  On this picture, most people who believe that God exists arrive at their theistic beliefs not by way of argument, but non-inferentially in ways that are shaped by cognitive mechanisms like HADD.  Further, it is argued that ‘unguided’ explanations of theistic belief, explanations that do not rely on God playing some role in using these cognitive mechanisms, do better than ‘guided’ explanations.​[39]​  This is because it is unlikely that God would utilize such mechanisms to produce theistic belief.  Marsh (2013) puts it this way,

[T]here is no reason to expect that cognitive tools that were designed by natural selection for nonreligious purposes would, in turn, lead people to favor theism and disfavor alternatives to theism. In fact, since the outputs of our mental tools, like our agency detection devices, are likely to be highly nonspecific and highly sensitive to local factors in the environment, then the byproduct view gives us reason to expect serious religious diversity and early nonbelief in God… Nothing about HADD or other capacities discussed in CSR requires that one will come to believe in God. If anything, it seems like theistic concepts would later evolve from nontheistic concepts that were initially triggered by mental tools like HADD. (361- 362).

So, if God utilized these cognitive mechanisms to produce theistic belief, God would be doing so at the expense of bringing about substantial diversity in religious belief including a myriad of false beliefs.​[40]​  If this is correct, then the best explanation of the prevalence of theistic belief is not its truth.





Other Defeating Evidence 

Since, as formulated, CCA is an inference to the best explanation, it is perfectly possible that the premises are all reasonable for you to accept, but that nevertheless other evidence in your total body of evidence prevents these premises from making it rational to believe the conclusion.  Since abductive arguments are invalid, the truth of their premises is insufficient to guarantee the truth of the conclusion.​[44]​  So, whether CCA succeeds in making it reasonable to believe that God exists will depend upon what else it is reasonable for you to believe about God’s existence.  For instance, your appreciation of the problem of evil may provide defeating evidence that prevents CCA from being a successful argument for you.  So, a full evaluation of CCA cannot occur in isolation from other considerations for and against God’s existence.  Whether it can succeed will depend up the success/failure of arguments and considerations against God’s existence.
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^1	  The common consent argument is often thought to illustrate an instance of the bandwagon fallacy or argumentum ad populum, a problematic kind of mental herd behavior where something is believed based on the majority believing it.
^2	  Kelly (2011) notes that the argument is not even mentioned in a number of central texts about arguments regarding God’s existence: Mackie’s The Miracle of Theism, Sobel’s Logic and Theism, Swinburne’s The Existence of God, the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, and Blackwell’s A Companion to Philosophy of Religion.  Of course, this list is far from exhaustive, but it does paint a picture.
^3	  For an overview of how the argument was seen historically, see Reid (2015).
^4	  Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism.  Being three Essays on Religion p. 128 
^5	  See also Kreeft and Tacelli, p. 84.
^6	  Kelly (2011) has a more modest reading of the CCA, there the prevalence of theistic belief only gives some reason to believe that God exists.
^7	  Formalizing an inference to the best explanation in this way follows Poston and McCain (forthcoming).
^8	  This example follows Kelly (2011).
^9	  See, http://globalreligiousfutures.org/explorer#/?subtopic=15&chartType=pie&year=2010&data_type=number&religious_affiliation=all&destination=to&countries=Worldwide&age_group=all&gender=all&pdfMode=false. These numbers do not directly carry over to religious belief since individuals may identify with one of these religions without claiming to believe that God exists, seeing religious adherence as a form of non-doxastic faith or practice. A further complication arises regarding whether Christians, Jews, and Muslims who do believe that God exists, actually hold the same belief. On this issue, See Kelly (2011) and Bogardus & Urban (2017).
^10	  https://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-exec/.
^11	  As Zuckerman (2007, p. 47) points out, data on this issue is fraught with methodological hurdles. Response rates are typically low, involve non-randomly selected samples, and involve surveying individuals in adverse political and cultural climates.  Further, while the above numbers come from Zuckerman, he seems to include individuals who do not believe in a monotheistic or personal God in the category of theist believers.
^12	  For an argument as to why the beliefs of those no longer living are epistemically relevant, see Carey and Matheson (2015).
^13	  In fact, it might be thought that God’s existing would come with near universal belief that God exists.  We will examine this objection later in the paper.
^14	  This is Kelly’s (2011) example.
^15	  For a survey of the literature on the epistemology of disagreement and a more detailed discussion of the role of higher-order evidence in it, see Matheson (2015).
^16	  See Kelly (2005) and Titlebaum (2015) for two notable exceptions.
^17	  For more on the connection between disagreement and agreement, see Easwaran et. al. (2016) and Matheson (2015).
^18	  For more on the Condorcet Jury Theorem and this example, see Estlund (1994).
^19	  Surowiecki (2004), Sustein (2005; 2008), and Solomon (2010) are good examples.
^20	  Surowiecki (2003): 4.
^21	  See McGrath (2009) for posing the problem of moral deference, and Hills (2013) for seeing the landscape of the debate.
^22	  See McElreath, Matheson, and Nobis (2018) for more on this connection.
^23	  For in depth discussions on belief dependence and independence, see Barnett (forthcoming), Estlund (1994) and Lackey (2013).
^24	  See Bogardus (2013) and White (2010) for discussions of the problem of contingency.
^25	  Smith (2019, p. 5) notes that wars have been fought, taxes levied, marriages forbidden, and continents colonized, all of which led to a cultural diffusion of theistic belief.
^26	  Kelly (2011) notes the relevance of independence in claiming that no one would think that the intellectual case for Islam would be greater if only majority Muslim countries had a higher birth-rate over the past decade (nor would it be weaker had they had a lower birth-rate). Zuckerman (2007) points out that the distribution of theistic belief/disbelief is greatly affected by birthrates.  Since religious nations tend to have higher birthrates than irreligious nations, people with religious views constitute a growing proportion of the world’s population. See also Norris and Inglehart (2004) on this point.
^27	  See Lackey (2013) for a detailed discussion of varieties of belief independence and how non-independently formed beliefs can still have epistemic impact. Notice that even in the recycling case it is plausible that the neighbors came to their recycling beliefs from some shared source like an HOA mailing. In such cases, even their recycling beliefs lack an important kind of independence.
^28	  Lackey (2013) calls this ‘autonomous belief dependence’, p. 249.
^29	  A final worry is that even though theistic belief is more prevalent than not right now, once we appreciate how the numbers are changing across time, it looks like theistic belief is trending down.  For instance, in the United States, belief in God has declined from 92% in 2007 to 89% in 2014, with sharper drops in categories that require being fairly certain that God exists from 88% in 2007 to 83% in 2014. If theistic belief is trending down, does that mean that the majority opinion is not to be trusted? It depends upon what the best explanation of the trend is. Is the decline of theistic belief merely a cultural trend, like intellectual bell bottoms, or does it indicate that we are making intellectual progress toward the truth? Further, one might question if theistic belief is indeed trending down. While there are decreases in theistic belief in the West, these changes appear to be compensated by much larger gains elsewhere (e.g. Africa, China).
^30	  This follows Schellenberg (1993).
^31	  For a fuller treatment of the problem of divine hiddenness see Howard-Snyder and Moser (2002) and Schellenberg (1993).
^32	  See Cullison (2010) and Dumsday (2010) for two examples.
^33	  See McBrayer and Swenson (2012) and Howard-Snyder (2015) for two examples.
^34	  Thanks to Tomas Bogardus for this helpful example.
^35	  For a discussion of these rival explanations, see Kelly (2011) and Plantinga (2000; 2011).
^36	  In this literature, the focus of the debate has been on whether the cognitive science of religion lays the foundation for a kind of debunking argument against the rationality of religious belief.  Our focus here is simply on how well it can explain the existence of religious belief (ignoring debates about the reliability of such mechanisms).
^37	  Braddock (2016).
^38	  See Barrett (2004) for a detailed defense of this view.
^39	  See Braddock (2016).
^40	  This is due to the prevalence of pantheistic and finite god beliefs brought about by these cognitive mechanisms.  For more on this point, see Braddock.
^41	  Smith (2019) argues that such an evolutionary debunking argument has a stronger opponent in animism as opposed to theism.
^42	  See Thurow (2013) for more on this point.
^43	  See Plantinga (2000; 2011) for a detailed defense of this claim.
^44	  It is important to remember that an argument being invalid is not itself a reason to reject it. Invalid arguments can still be very strong. The recycling argument is but one instance of a good (invalid) argument.
^45	  Since most people have never considered CCA, most people do not have a belief about it. So, the version of a common consent argument that applies to itself must restrict the relevant population to those who have considered the argument. This parallels the way in which the relevant population was restricted to people in my neighborhood in the recycling argument.
^46	  Special thanks to Tomas Bogardus, Nate King, and Ted Poston for helpful comments on this paper, and to Jamie Lang for her help as a research assistant.
